FullReads

Cri.
It does hold good.

Socr.
And does this hold good or not, that to live well and Honorable and justly are the same thing?

Cri.
It does.

9.
Socr.
From what has been admitted, then, this consideration arises, whether it is just or not that I should endeavor to leave this place without the permission of the Athenians. And should it appear to be just, we will make the attempt, but if not, we will give it up. But as to the considerations which you mention, of an outlay of money, reputation, and the education of children, beware, Crito, lest such considerations as these in reality belong to these multitudes, who rashly put one to death, and would restore one to life, if they could do so, without any reason at all. But we, since reason so requires, must consider nothing else than what we just now mentioned, whether we shall act justly in paying money and contracting obligations to those who will lead me hence, as well they who lead me as we who are led hence, or whether, in truth, we shall not act unjustly in doing all these things. And if we should appear in so doing to be acting unjustly, observe that we must not consider whether from remaining here and continuing quiet we must needs die, or suffer any thing else, rather than whether we shall be acting unjustly.

Cri.
You appear to me to speak wisely, Socrates, but see what we are to do.

Socr.
Let us consider the matter together, my friend, and if you have any thing to object to what I say, make good your objection, and I will yield to you, but if not, cease, my excellent friend, to urge upon me the same thing so often, that I ought to depart hence against the will of the Athenians. For I highly esteem your endeavors to persuade me thus to act, so long as it is not against my will Consider, then, the beginning of our inquiry, whether it is stated to your entire satisfaction, and endeavor to answer the question put to you exactly as you think right.

Cri.
I will endeavor to do so.

10.
Socr.
Say we, then, that we should on no account deliberately commit injustice, or may we commit injustice under certain circumstances, under others not? Or is it on no account either good or honorable to commit injustice, as we have often agreed on former occasions, and as we just now said? Or have all those our former admissions been dissipated in these few days, and have we, Crito, old men as we are, been for a long time seriously conversing with each other without knowing that we in no respect differ from children? Or does the case, beyond all question, stand as we then determined? Whether the multitude allow it or not, and whether we must suffer a more severe or a milder punishment than this, still is injustice on every account both evil and disgraceful to him who commits it? Do we admit this, or not?

Cri.
We do admit it.

Socr.
On no account, therefore, ought we to act unjustly.

Cri.
Surely not.

Socr.
Neither ought one who is injured to return the injury, as the multitude think, since it is on no account right to act unjustly.

Cri.
It appears not.

Socr.
What, then? Is it right to do evil, Crito, or not?

Cri.
Surely it is not right, Socrates.

Socr.
But what? To do evil in return when one has been evil-entreated, is that right, or not?

Cri.
By no means.

Socr.
For to do evil to men differs in no respect from committing injustice.