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Phil
. It is, and very fairly stated, I think this, in common with Mr. Malthus; and can hold out but little hope that I shall ever cease to think it.

X.
“Why, then, know this,
Thou think’st amiss;
And, to think right, thou must think o’er again.”

[Footnote: Suckling’s well-known song. ]

Phed
. But is it possible that Mr. Ricardo can require me to abjure an inference so reasonable as this? If so, I must frankly acknowledge that I am out of the saddle already.

X
. Reasonable inference? So far from that, there is an end of all logic if such an inference be tolerated. That man may rest assured that his vocation in this world is not logical, who feels disposed (after a few minutes’ consideration) to question the following proposition,–namely: That it is very possible for A continually to increase in value–in real value, observe–and yet to command a continually decreasing quantity of B; in short, that A may acquire a thousand times higher value, and yet exchange for ten thousand times less of B.

Phed
. Why, then, “chaos is come again!” Is this the unparadoxical Ricardo?

X
. Yes, Phaedrus; but lay not this unction to your old prejudices, which you must now prepare to part with forever, that it is any spirit of wilful paradox which is now speaking; for get rid of Mr. Ricardo, if you can, but you will not, therefore, get rid of this paradox. On any other theory of value whatsoever, it will still continue to be an irresistible truth, though it is the Ricardian theory only which can consistently explain it. Here, by the way, is a specimen of paradox in the true and laudable sense–in that sense according to which Boyle entitled a book “Hydrostatical Paradoxes;” for, though it wears a prima facie appearance of falsehood, yet in the end you will be sensible that it is not only true, but true in that way and degree which will oblige him who denies it to maintain an absurdity. Again, therefore, I affirm that, when the laborer obtains a large quantity of corn, for instance, it is so far from being any fair inference that wages are then at a high real value, that in all probability they are at a very low real value; and inversely I affirm, that when wages are at their very highest real value, the laborer will obtain the very smallest quantity of corn. Or, quitting wages altogether (because such an illustration would drive me into too much anticipation), I affirm universally of Y (that is, of any assignable thing whatsoever), that it shall grow more valuable ad infinitum, and yet by possibility exchange for less and less ad infinitum of Z (that is, of any other assignable thing).

Phed
. Well, all I shall say is this,–am I in a world where men stand on their heads or on their feet? But there is some trick in all this; there is some snare. And now I consider–what’s the meaning of your saying “by possibility”? If the doctrine you would force upon me be a plain, broad, straightforward truth, why fetter it with such a suspicious restriction?

X
. Think, for a moment, Phaedrus, what doctrine it is which I would force upon you; not, as you seem to suppose, that the quantity obtained by Y is in the inverse ratio of the value of Y; on the contrary, if that were so, it would still remain true that an irresistible inference might be drawn from the quantity purchased to the value of the thing purchasing, and vice versa, from the value of the thing purchasing to the quantity which it would purchase. There would still be a connection between the two; and the sole difference between my doctrine and the old doctrine would be this–that the connection would be no longer direct (as by your doctrine), but inverse. This would be the difference, and the sole difference. But what is it that I assert? Why, that there is no connection at all, or of any kind, direct or inverse, between the quantity commanded and the value commanding. My object is to get rid of your inference, not to substitute any new inference of my own. I put, therefore, an extreme case. This case ought by your doctrine to be impossible. If, therefore, it be not impossible, your doctrine is upset. Simply as a possible case, it is sufficient to destroy you. But, if it were more than a possible case, it would destroy me. For if, instead of demonstrating the possibility of such a case, I had attempted to show that it were a universal and necessary case, I should again be introducing the notion of a connection between the quantity obtained and the value obtaining, which it is the very purpose of my whole argument to exterminate. For my thesis is, that no such connection subsists between the two as warrants any inference that the real value is great because the quantity it buys is great, or small because the quantity it buys is small; or, reciprocally, that, because the real value is great or small, therefore the quantities bought shall be great or small. From, or to, the real value in these cases, I contend that there is no more valid inference, than from, or to, the nominal value with which it is contrasted.