PAGE 14
A World Of Pure Experience
by
[33] [Cf. H. Lotze: Metaphysik, Secs. 37-39, 97, 98, 243.]
[34] Mr. Bradley, not professing to know his absolute aliunde, nevertheless derealizes Experience by alleging it to be everywhere infected with self-contradiction. His arguments seem almost purely verbal, but this is no place for arguing that point out. [Cf. F. H. Bradley; Appearance and Reality, passim; and below, pp. 106-122.]
[35] Of which all that need be said in this essay is that it also can be conceived as functional, and defined in terms of transitions, or of the possibility of such. [Cf. Principles of Psychology, vol. I, pp. 473-480, vol. II, pp. 337-340; Pragmatism, p. 265; Some Problems of Philosophy, pp. 63-74; Meaning of Truth, pp. 246-247, etc. ED.]
[36] [Cf. below, pp. 93 ff.]
[37] [Cf. “How Two Minds Can Know One Thing,” below, pp. 123-136.]
[38] The notion that our objects are inside of our respective heads is not seriously defensible, so I pass it by.
[39] [The argument is resumed below, pp. 101 sq. ED.]
[40] Our minds and these ejective realities would still have space (or pseudo-space, as I believe Professor Strong calls the medium of interaction between ‘things-in-themselves’) in common. These would exist where, and begin to act where, we locate the molecules, etc., and where we perceive the sensible phenomena explained thereby. [Cf. Morton Prince: The Nature of Mind, and Human Automatism, part I, ch. III, IV; C. A. Strong: Why the Mind Has a Body, ch. XII.]
[41] [Cf. below, p. 188; A Pluralistic Universe, Lect. IV-VII.]
[42] I have said something of this latter alliance in an article entitled ‘Humanism and Truth,’ in Mind, October, 1904. [Reprinted in The Meaning of Truth, pp. 51-101. Cf. also “Humanism and Truth Once More,” below, pp. 244-265.]